INTRODUCTION
Retail sales taxes have been an American fiscal success. 1 The tax that Mississippi initiated in 1932 by converting its fractional rate general business tax into a two percent tax on retail sales gave the state a tax that produced considerable revenue at low statutory rates and could be easily collected in relatively painless amounts on each transaction. These taxes gave states an alternative to help them weather the collapse of property tax revenue during the Great Depression. The spread of the tax was dramatic: by 1938, 26 states (plus Hawaii) had adopted the tax. After that fiscal catastrophe, retail sales taxes provided important support for the considerable increase in state government in the post-World War II era.
Retail sales taxes have now been the largest single source of tax revenue for states for 50 years, currently yielding more than $130 billion annually. In fiscal 1994, these taxes produced more revenue than any other tax for 23 of the 50 state governments. Revenues amount to a bit more than one-third of all state tax revenue; 12 states collect 40 percent or more of their tax revenue from their general sales tax. These sales taxes also yield ten percent of local government revenue, a share so low only because of the near-total domination of the property tax in the finances of local school districts. The retail sales tax is a vital contributor to the finances of state and local government as the only broad-based tax on consumption in the United States revenue system. The sales tax seems the model of simplicity to the customer making a purchase: the tax is added easily and conveniently to the price at the time of purchase. That appearance is misleading. As Simons (1950, p. 9 ) wrote many years ago, the sales tax "is a simple tax only in the sense that most people have no part in its technical operation." Because the tax levied by the states excludes many business and household purchases and requires vendors to distinguish which sales are exempt and which are taxed, business compliance with and government administration of the tax is far more complex than its appearance at the cash register. Nevertheless, state sales tax compliance seems to reach levels that federal income tax collectors can only dream about, although good data on the question are sparse: a Tennessee study (Adams and Johnson, 1989 ) estimated the percentage of sales tax voluntarily reported against total tax liability at 95.9 percent in that state, and a Washington state study (Washington Department of Revenue, 1990 ) estimated its rate to be 98.3 percent.
2 Few believe sales tax compliance rates to be a severe problem, although that belief stems more from faith rather than from research.
Because the retail sales tax has been so productive for state governments, it is not surprising that some propose a national retail sales tax as a replacement for federal income taxes in the pursuit of fundamental tax reform. It does offer one alternative for moving the federal revenue system from heavy reliance on income taxes toward taxation based on consumption. However, such a change requires a clear understanding of the structure of the state retail sales taxes and what problems a heavier use of these taxes might create. The following sections will examine the logic of the retail sales tax, the extent to which state sales taxes are structured according to that logic, and the potential for a national sales tax that follows the design of these state taxes.
THE IDEA OF A RETAIL SALES TAX
A retail sales tax as a practical application of consumption taxation does have considerable appeal for improvement of national economic prospects and for improvement of fairness in the distribution of the cost of government. More than 40 years ago, Kaldor (1955) based on actual spending rates each individual's spending capacity according to the yardstick which he applies to himself. Once actual spending is taken as the criterion all the problems created by the non-comparability of workincomes and property-incomes, of temporary and permanent sources of wealth, of genuine and fictitious capital gains resolve themselves; they are all brought into equivalence in the measure in which they support the actual standards of living" (1955, p. 47) . Assigning a higher tax burden to those who spend more surely represents an ability-to-pay standard consistent with consumer sovereignty and market choice. How much the consumer believes he or she can afford to purchase from the private market becomes the standard according to which a portion of the cost of government will be distributed. Furthermore, by being collected on each transaction instead of on some end-of-year accounting, the retail sales tax variant of the consumption tax is particularly convenient for taxpayers.
The consumption base also has a strong foundation on grounds of economic efficiency, particularly as an alternative to a tax on income. As Cnossen and Sandford (1988, p. 32) note, switching from income to consumption tax bases "will reduce the difference between the pre-and-post tax return to saving that encourages taxpayers to consume rather than save, so saving will be encouraged by the change and the growth path of the economy may subsequently move upwards." This effect has generally defied precise measurement in the United States, partly because of the difficulty of understanding what influences private saving and partly because the country has no experience with a tax solely on household consumption. Nevertheless, to end the disincentive to save that results from taxing the returns to saving under an income tax, and thus possibly to improve the prospective path of real economic growth, provides a tempting argument for consumption taxation. One prominent advocate of the national retail sales tax maintains that substituting it for the income tax would produce "...a capital formation boom with strongly increased productivity, higher paying jobs, and new investment from around the world" (Lugar, 1995, p. 3) .
A retail sales tax following the ideal of a tax on consumption expenditure would require two structural principles (Due and Mikesell, 1994, p. 16) : "a. It should apply to all consumption expenditures, and thus to all sales for consumption purposes, at a uniform rate. Failure to do so will distort relative outputs of various goods and services, discriminate among various families on the basis of consumer preferences, and, frequently, complicate compliance and administration because of the need to distinguish between taxable and nontaxable items and among sales at various rates. "b. It should apply only to consumption expenditures, and thus not to savings or to purchases for use in production. Taxation of savings or uses of savings would contradict the consumption intent of the tax. Taxation of production inputs has several undesirable consequences, including that of producing a haphazard and unknown final pattern of distribution of burden among various families."
The retail sales tax is limited to consumption expenditure by suspending application of tax to business purchases. Businesses apply tax to their sales, except when the purchaser provides suspension documentation-a certificate of exemption-ordering that the retail sales tax not be applied. The certificate identifies (1) the purchaser as National Tax Journal Vol 50 no. 1 (March 1997) pp. 149-65 3 a registered business eligible to make exempt purchases and (2) the business use of the item that makes it nontaxable.
3 When the suspension system works, no business in the chain of production and distribution bringing product to the household consumer would have paid tax on its purchases, because each business would have presented its tax suspension certificate to the seller. The consuming household is not a registered business, can offer no suspension certificate, and must pay the tax on its purchases. Through the suspension process, the tax rests uniformly and exclusively on household consumption. If business purchases of what they use to produce what they sell are entirely excluded and all household purchases of goods and services are taxed, the retail sales tax will be a tax on final sales to consumers-a general consumption tax.
Because state sales taxes miss the standard, they do not have all the advantages claimed for a tax on general consumption expenditure. The taxes now are partial taxes on both household consumption and business input purchases. Surprisingly enough, many states continue to have sales taxes that discourage capital formation by taxing the acquisition of many business inputs, including real capital assets.
AMERICAN RETAIL SALES TAXES AND THE IDEAL
Forty-five states plus the District of Columbia (all states except Alaska, Delaware, Montana, Oregon, and New Hampshire) and more than 6,000 local governments levy retail sales taxes. Among the sales tax states, statutory rates ranged from three percent (Colorado) to seven percent in mid-1996, with a mean of 5.18 percent. Seventeen states levied rates of six percent or higher. That is considerably increased from the range in 1970 from two percent (five states) to six percent, with a mean rate of 3.54 percent. Furthermore, only one state levied a six percent rate and only five levied a five percent rate. The pace of rate increases has declined during the 1990s, as strong state finances have reduced the need to increase rates.
Although states tend to copy law from their neighbors, no state sales tax exactly matches any other and the different structures take dramatically different shares of their state economies. Nevertheless, the sales taxes share some elements. (1) All are levies "imposed upon the sales, or elements incidental to the sales, such as receipts from them, of all or a wide range of commodities" (Due, 1957, p. 3) . (2) All have a system for suspending tax on items purchased for resale so that the cost of inventory to a retailer will not include sales tax paid on its acquisition. (3) All levy rates of one percent or higher on retail transactions. (4) All encourage, if not require, separate quotation of the tax in each transaction except in special circumstances and all but Arizona prohibit retailers from advertising that they will absorb or refund the tax (Due and Mikesell, 1994) . Beyond those elements, the coverage choices dramatically influence the nature of the tax base. . That means, holding size of economy constant, each percentage point of tax from the broadest coverage taxes will yield more than twice the revenue of the narrowest coverage tax. While these states all levy a sales tax, the legislative choices made in structuring each tax have caused dramatically different tax bases. Major differences include the taxation of household purchases of goods, taxation of services, and exclusion of business purchases.
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The Taxation of Household Purchases of Goods
Retail sales taxes are typically general taxes on the purchase (or sale) of tangible personal property and selective taxes on certain purchases (or sale) of service. States have chosen, however, to exempt certain household purchases of goods from the tax. State legislatures understand that households with low annual income spend a higher portion of that income than do higher income households and seek to avoid the appearance of a regressive tax under which tax liability as a fraction of income declines with household income.
6 They respond by removing certain expenditure categories from tax. Exemption favors households with relatively greater preference for the exempt commodity, reduces revenue from the given statutory rate, makes collection more difficult for vendors and tax authorities, and may distort use of productive resources. The presumption is against exemption unless there are extraordinary reasons otherwise, and any exemption goes against the principle of general consumption taxation.
Food exemptions
States exempt food purchased for preparation at home to reduce regressivity and thereby remove roughly one-fifth of all household consumption on goods from the tax base.
7 The exemption makes the sales tax more vulnerable to business recessions, causes tax payments by families to vary according to preferences for food, and complicates compliance and administration (Mikesell, 1996b) . Furthermore, Congress requires those states choosing to otherwise tax food to exempt purchases made with food stamps, as a price for participation in the program. Only 19 states, all west of the Mississippi River, now tax food fully, 25 exempt food fully, and three provide a reduced rate.
8 Twenty-five years ago, the numbers were reversed: 28 states taxed food, 16 exempted food, and 1 state provided a reduced rate.
Items subject to an excise
Motor fuel, tobacco product, and alcohol beverage taxes are the most important examples of excised items that states have exempted from their retail sales taxes. An excise implies economic or social reasons for placing an extra tax burden on the consumption of the excised item. To then exempt the taxed items from the general tax makes no sense. Only ten states apply their retail sales tax to motor fuel: Arizona, California, Georgia (taxed at one National Tax Journal Vol 50 no. 1 (March 1997) 
Clothing
A half-dozen states-Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Islandexempt some clothing purchases, presumably under the assumption that exempting these necessities improves fairness of the tax. Evidence suggests that spending patterns across income classes are such that this exemption gives greater relief to high-income as opposed to low-income families (Schaefer, 1969) . It therefore reduces revenue yield and makes collection of the tax somewhat more difficult, without the desired equity effect.
Utilities
Many states exclude from tax major utilities-electric, gas, water, and intrastate telephone-purchased by residential customers. Even fewer states tax interstate telephone charges. Until 1989, states believed that such taxes would violate the commerce clause of the constitution and thus avoided taxing these charges. The U.S. Supreme Court (Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 US 452, 109 S. Ct. 582, 585 (1989) ) held that they do not, but states have been slow to react.
This brief review shows that the retail sales taxes are not general taxes on household consumption of goods, but rather taxes that exempt broad categories of consumption. Each exemption (1) violates the logic of a general consumption expenditure tax, (2) reduces revenue yield from any particular advertised tax rate, and (3) complicates compliance and administration. Most have been adopted to improve perceived fairness of the system and to provide tax relief. However, other means -notably annual rebates or credits offered through other portions of the overall tax system-can provide assistance at lower revenue cost and with less economic distortion. While retail sales tax coverage of the purchases of goods is broad, these taxes certainly are not uniform taxes on household consumption of goods.
Taxing Services
A tax on consumption should not treat household expenditure on goods, e.g., the purchases of a television, differently than household expenditure on a service, e.g., the repair of that television. Both are consumption expenditures. In practice, the retail sales tax more often than not reflects the pattern for such taxes established in the 1930s: the base is simply defined to be tax purchases of National Tax Journal Vol 50 no. 1 (March 1997) pp. 149-65 tangible personal property. Taxation of services usually amounts to a legislative afterthought, often limited to transient lodgings, rental of tangible personal properties, property repairs and installation, and admissions, and not all taxes go even that far. For instance, many taxes do not tax the servicing of items that are taxable when sold. States have been especially reluctant to tax professional services provided by physicians, dentists, lawyers, accountants, and casualty insurers.
State sales taxes can be generally divided into three broad groups for taxation of service purchases (Due and Mikesell, 1994; Research Institute of America, 1996) :
General coverage
This coverage excludes services rendered by employees to employers and a few categories such as financial intermediation. All service purchases are taxed unless the statute specifically exempts them. No retail sales tax fully integrates taxation of services with taxation of goods, but Hawaii, New Mexico, and South Dakota provide the broadest coverage, the first two from their adoption and the latter by later expansion.
Extensive taxation of services
Repair, installation, maintenance, and other services associated with tangible personal properties are taxed, along with a long list of specifically identified services (parking, landscaping, pest control, laundry and dry cleaning, and cable television are common examples). Medical, optical, and dental care, legal services, and other professional services seldom are taxed, however. Iowa, Minnesota, and Texas provide the broadest list in terms of economic significance of the taxed services (although Minnesota misses repair and installation services). Other states with similarly extensive taxation of services include the following: Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Limited or no coverage of service purchases
The tax applies to purchases of tangible personal property and makes no concerted attempt to tax services. A few selected services may be specifically taxed, but some of the states involved tax no services at all. The 23 states not previously mentioned in the other categories fall into this one.
A consumption expenditure tax that includes household purchases of services would have significant fiscal advantages. First, taxing services will increase the yield from any given statutory tax rate. The impact depends on what services are added and what purchases are already in the tax base. Adding household purchases of repair, installation, and maintenance of tangible personal property and services rendered by commercial establishmentsincluding those for personal care-can increase revenue by 10 to 15 percent, much of that from services related to automobiles. Taxation of privately provided services-babysitting, housecleaning, etc.-is not administratively feasible and taxation of medical and dental services may create unacceptable social problems. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the broader base will grow somewhat more rapidly, because a growing percentage of household spending is on services rather than commodities (Duncombe, 1992) . National income data show that, from 1985 through 1994, the service National Tax Journal Vol 50 no. 1 (March 1997) pp. 149-65 component of personal consumption spending increased at an annual rate of 7.4 percent, compared with a rate of 5.1 percent for the goods component. Not all that service spending would reasonably be taxed, but the difference between the rates for services and for goods illustrates the pattern.
Second, taxing services can reduce discrimination according to household preferences. Without taxing services, persons with high preferences for services pay less tax than equivalently situated consumers with lower preferences for services. The impact on regressiveness is not so clear. Evidence shows existing taxes with broad-based extension to services leave the tax regressive to income levels of around $30,000, above which the tax is roughly proportional (Fox and Murray, 1988) . Siegfried and Smith (1991) find that the short-lived extension of the Florida sales tax to selected services in 1987 reduced regressivity. However, whether adding services to any existing goods-oriented sales tax would reduce regressivity depends crucially on what the existing tax has exempted (and taxed) and what services are added.
Finally, limiting the tax to commodities causes difficult problems when goods and services are sold together. Examples include computer programs (purchase of the physical disk or the service of the program?) and glasses (the physical eyeglasses or the services of the optometrist?), although there are also problems with repair charges that involve both materials and labor.
Taxing services does, however, present puzzles. First, firms selling services are frequently small. The firms are often highly specialized and there are few economies from large size because the labor content of the value of the product is considerable. As a result, administration would be more difficult for the authorities and compliance would involve small firms with less skill and sophistication with the tax system. The authorities can deal with the problem by taxing the purchases of such service firms, thus letting their customers pay the tax indirectly. That is generally the approach many valueadded taxes (VATs) use when they exempt small businesses from collecting tax on their sales, but not from paying tax on their purchases. This is implicitly the approach used by American states: businesses selling services do not have tax suspended on their purchases. Where the labor content of the final sales to the consumer is high, however, a considerable portion of consumption expenditure will go untaxed.
Second, many services have mixed use, being purchased by both households and businesses. For example, attorneys work for both businesses and households. The retail sales tax requires the seller to segregate business use from private use at purchase, apply tax to the proper transactions and be prepared to justify the remainder, and separately account for the two flows. The burden can be a problem for the seller. And the tax authorities face a similar set of tasks on unraveling flows on audit. To prevent the complications, retail sales taxes characteristically exclude difficult service transactions from the base-and, for good measure, exclude the simple ones as well.
Excluding Business Purchases
The business purchase exemption maintains the logic of a tax on household consumption, keeps the tax from discouraging capital investment by being imposed on purchases of machinery and equipment, and reduces a National Tax Journal Vol 50 no. 1 (March 1997) pp. 149-65 barrier to state economic development. The exemption is critical to prevent the tax from applying to multiple stages in the production and distribution chain and the tax pyramiding that results. The truth of the state retail sales taxes does not follow that model.
In practice, retail sales taxes exempt items purchased for resale and components or ingredients of items to be produced for sale. Many also exempt industrial and agricultural machinery purchased for production, but not all do. A few states, including California, Nevada, South Dakota, Washington, Wyoming, and Hawaii, fully tax industrial machinery purchases and a number of states exempt only machinery purchased for new and expanded production or tax such purchases at a preferential rate. The states also vary dramatically in the extent to which their taxes exempt consumables, fuels, and utilities, even when clearly used in production. 10 A number of states turn the concept of consumption tax entirely on its head by taxing business purchases of fuels and utilities, while exempting their purchase by households. State sales taxes by no means remove business purchases from the tax.
States face considerable temptation to include business purchases in their retail sales tax base. Goods purchased for business use are just as physically "finished" or final as those purchased by households. By that standard, there is no difference between a refrigerator purchased by a restaurant and a refrigerator purchased by a family, except possibly the size. Both customers are "final." Taxing both purchases increases revenue from any given statutory rate, and including both seems to avoid a business tax preference. However, the tax on the restaurant purchase becomes part of operating cost, no less than the cost of labor, supplies, or other purchases of the firm. The refrigerator, although physically finished, is not economically final because it contributes to the production of a good or service bought by a household. The critical element for tax policy is not whether the product is finished but rather whether the purchase is household consumption or business cost.
Including business purchases creates two problems. First, these extra costs get hidden from customers, being reflected in final prices by varying amounts that depend on market conditions and on the extent to which businesses purchase taxed inputs. Thus, embedded sales tax paid by households would differ according to the sort of purchases made, rather than being a uniform percent of consumption. Second, taxing inputs distorts production decisions. The tax discourages investment in production and distribution equipment by reducing the net return from their acquisition and depressing the prospects for economic development. Joulfaian and Mackie (1992, p. 102) present the problem: "Sales taxes on purchases of capital assets can be fairly large. For some assets, the combined state and local sales tax rate can be nearly as high as 6 percent of the sales price. Furthermore, sales tax rates vary dramatically across investments, averaging 4.2 percent for equipment, 1.6 percent for structures, and 0 percent for inventories and land. Thus, sales taxes can affect both the overall average incentive to save and invest, as well as the allocation of investment across assets." In other words, American retail sales taxes, as they are structured, do not have the benign (or even encouraging) effect on investment that a consumption tax should to have. Furthermore, vertically National Tax Journal Vol 50 no. 1 (March 1997) pp. 149-65 integrated firms able to avoid purchasing from outside suppliers have an extra competitive advantage, and distortions are likely to reduce domestic capital investment and economic growth.
Unfortunately, exempting business purchases appears to favor households over businesses, so removing intermediate goods from tax has proven to be a difficult legislative challenge. Legislatures have had difficulty understanding that exempting business purchases represents a refinement to apply the tax to the defensible base, not an unwarranted tax advantage for business. And, at least as important, it is an argument that the voting public and the media have difficulty understanding. Therefore, the typical state sales tax base includes a sizable chunk of business purchases that simply do not belong in a consumption tax.
There is no entirely satisfactory estimate of the extent to which business purchasers bear the impact of state sales taxes. All evidence does indicate that the portion is substantial, although it obviously differs according to the structure of each state tax and the nature of the state economy. One study (Ring, 1989) estimated the national average to be 41 percent of the tax paid by business purchasers, with a range from around 20 percent (Maryland and Virginia) to 65 percent (Wyoming and Louisiana).
11 Individual state studies also estimate the business share to be considerable. For instance, Texas estimated the share there to be 58 percent while Iowa estimated its share to be 39 percent (Due and Mikesell, 1994) . A sizable component of the tax base is business purchases, and much of the tax paid by these businesses will be reflected in higher prices of goods made by these inputs, although the impact on prices will undoubtedly not be uniform.
A NATIONAL RETAIL SALES TAX?
Retail sales taxes and VATs offer two economically equivalent alternatives for collecting a broad indirect, transactionbased tax on consumption expenditure. The taxes differ only in how they are administered. The VAT applies to each transaction in the flow of output to the consumer; in its most common variant, each business pays tax on its purchases but is reimbursed from tax collected on its sales. By that means, only the household consumer bears the tax, business purchases having been removed from tax by the refunding process. The retail sales tax applies only to the final consumer purchase, business purchases having been exempt by the suspension certificate. The two apparently dissimilar taxes differ only (but importantly) in the mechanism they use to relieve business purchases from tax, allowing the tax to apply to consumption.
Most national governments have selected the VAT, rather than the retail sales tax, as their general consumption tax. More than 100 countries around the world, including all those in Europe, all of Latin America, Japan, and Canada levy the tax; only the United States and Australia of the large industrial nations do not levy it. Countries have generally adopted the VAT for administrative advantages, especially when rates are high: the VAT more easily and completely excludes producers goods from tax, more completely includes consumer services in the base, and appears to provide a better defense against evasion (OECD, 1995) . Nevertheless, the retail sales tax is familiar to Americans. It is reasonable to consider that collection method if the federal tax system is to move toward greater reliance on taxes on consumption.
12 However, reflections from state experience should enlighten National Tax Journal Vol 50 no. 1 (March 1997) pp. 149-65 and caution Congress as it weighs the options.
Higher Reliance and Higher Rates
To replace the federal income taxes with a retail sales tax would mean much heavier use of the tax than the United States has experienced: the federal individual income tax alone produced over $590 billion in fiscal 1995, roughly four and one-half times the $132 billion generated by all state sales taxes, and the corporate income tax produced $157 billion more (OMB, 1996; Bureau of Census, 1996) . A national retail sales tax sufficient to replace existing federal individual and corporate income taxes would require a remarkably high rate. If the base of the national tax mirrored the median state sales tax (in fiscal 1994, Minnesota, with each one percent of tax rate generating 0.467 percent of personal income), then a national rate of 25.5 percent would be needed to replace the federal taxes. Copying the broadest tax would require a rate of 11 percent; copying the narrowest, a rate of 44 percent. 13 The message is clear: a national sales tax to replace the federal income taxes would require a rate considerably higher than the rates states now levy. Furthermore, the national tax would be on top of existing state and local rates-presumably these governments would not be forced to find other revenues when the federal government stepped in-and the combined rates would almost certainly be global records for such taxes! States can operate their sales taxes with their many imperfections as consumption levies because the statutory rates are relatively low. Purchasers and vendors generally comply, but the rates are low enough to keep the stakes from evasion relatively low. Imposing an American retail sales tax at replacement rates would almost certainly produce untenable economic distortions and increase compliance problems. One observer of retail sales taxation guesses: "At 5 percent, the incentive to evade tax is probably not worth the penalties of prosecution; at 10 percent, evasion is more attractive, and at 15-20 percent, becomes extremely tempting" (Tait, 1988, p. 18) . At the rates speculated here, evasion would be remarkably profitable and administration would become a greater challenge.
To the extent business purchases remained in the tax, vertically integrated firms able to acquire production assets without purchasing them from another business would enjoy considerable competitive advantage, and the tax applied to the purchase of capital assets would discourage investment. Furthermore, the embedded tax on business purchases would create difficult problems in international trade. It is impossible to know to what extent the sales tax is included in business cost at the point of export. Therefore, trade rules do not allow rebate of the tax. Adding a high but embedded and nonrefundable national sales tax to American products would create challenging competitive adjustments on international markets. Relatively low retail sales tax rates now do not present a major problem. That would change with the much higher national retail sales tax added on.
Taxing Consumption?
A national retail sales tax generally following the pattern of the state taxes would not be a general and uniform tax on consumption. State retail sales taxes are partial consumption taxes and partial business purchase taxes. They exempt many household purchases of goods, are narrowly selective in their National Tax Journal Vol 50 no. 1 (March 1997) pp. 149-65 coverage of household service purchases, and apply to a wide array of business inputs, including the purchase of capital assets. This hybrid tax would not have the performance influences on savings, investment, and economic development that a uniform and general consumption tax would have. State experience shows the political difficulty in getting the retail sales tax structured as a tax on consumption. Legislatures see many options for excluding consumption expenditure from tax in the pursuit of distributional equity or to boost regional causes.
However, the problem may be fundamental. The technique of tax suspension probably has inherent administrative limits in the completeness of business purchase exclusion it can achieve. Suspension places the burden of parsing between business purchases and household purchases on the vendor, not a tax authority, and the vendor has an inherent competitive incentive to grant the suspension. Hence, tax administrators face a continual need to police acceptance of suspension certificates. Authorities tighten to prevent evasion through misuse of suspension authority, but tightening makes tasks more difficult for vendors. Loosening makes evasion easier.
Could Congress devise a politically feasible approach to taxing household consumption so that the base closely approaches the consumption ideal, meets contemporary ideas about fairness in taxation, and keeps up with change in the economy? Could Congress manage to suspend more completely the tax on intermediate goods to protect investment, avoid economic distortion, and accommodate international competitiveness? Would Congress-the collective author of the current federal individual and corporate income taxes-be less susceptible to the pressures that have created the American state sales taxes than have the state legislatures?
Concerns About Compliance and Administration
A federal tax piggybacked on the existing state taxes would be completely inappropriate for a national tax because of the considerable state-by-state differences in the tax. For instance, a shopper buying a suit in New Jersey would pay the national sales tax; the shopper's cousin buying an identical suit in Pennsylvania would not pay the tax. Such differences would create major disruptions in interstate trade (adding the federal tax rate to existing state differentials would make cross-border shopping remarkably attractive on highticket items), as well as cause substantial differences in effective federal sales tax rates among the states. Determining the tax in the five states without a sales tax would be an interesting matter for Congress. Should such piggybacking be attempted, states would find it in the best interests of their citizens to adjust their sales taxes to the narrowest base possible as a means of minimizing their national tax burden.
Congress could prevent differences in effective rates across states by adopting its own national tax base. A distinct federally designed national retail sales tax might be a uniform and nondistorting consumption tax, avoiding all the imperfections that have emerged from the state legislatures. Experience with other federal taxes should cause some considerable skepticism about Congressional ability to pursue such purity in taxation, but even if the remarkable were to happen, there would still be problems. Vendors, the gatekeepers in any retail sales tax, National Tax Journal Vol 50 no. 1 (March 1997) pp. 149-65 would have to sort purchases as to taxability between the state and federal systems, and tax authorities would have to ensure that each sort was accurate. Of course, the federal government could force states to use the new federal base, but that would mean considerable loss of fiscal sovereignty. States have considerable experience in simultaneous administration of multiple taxes, so the primary new problem would be with compliance rather than administration.
As noted earlier, the extremely high combined national sales tax rate would change the stakes for taxpayer compliance. Most national governments have concluded that the clearer audit trail offered by VATs administered by the credit-invoice approach is important as an enforcement tool for high rate consumption taxes, and they reject the retail sales tax administrative approach. Congress needs to be prepared with considerable enforcement resources and zeal if it wants to prevent tax cheats from having a competitive advantage, given the much higher rewards to evasion with the high national tax rate. The compliance experience with the much lower state rates is probably irrelevant.
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Conclusions
Retail sales and use taxes have been a vital component of state and local government revenue systems since their inception during the Great Depression. They took over the slack left by the collapse of the real property tax and supported the considerable growth in state governments in the last halfcentury. They continue as the most important single tax levied by state governments, and they yield considerable revenue for support of local government. Structural problems, however, suggest that they would not be the best sort of general consumption tax if the federal government were to replace its income taxes. At the high rates required to yield enough revenue to replace the income taxes, problems of evasion and higher reward from avoidance, distortion caused by incomplete exclusion of business purchases, and narrow coverage of consumer services diminish the attractiveness of the retail sales tax. The taxes are not general taxes on consumption expenditure, and they do not have all the economic advantages associated with such taxes.
What are the conclusions for the American tax system? State and local governments should perfect their retail sales taxes as consumption expenditure levies. Surely the case for taxation of consumption being made at the national level has considerable validity for subnational taxes as well. The typical retail sales tax would need to be extended to professional services sold to households, personal services, and repair-and-installation sorts of services associated with goods whose purchase would be taxable. Producer purchase exemptions would need to be extended broadly to business inputs. These policy changes would improve the "capitalinvestment" aspect of tax climate and would dramatically reduce the number of sales tax cases in the judicial system. Neither broadening to services nor narrowing to exclude business purchases would be politically easy-if so, states would surely have made the changes years ago. Sales taxes are also challenged by marketing systems that lack a physical presence within the state -sales by catalog, telephone, computer network, etc. Constitutional restrictions prevent states from requiring such National Tax Journal Vol 50 no. 1 (March 1997) pp. 149-65 vendors to register for the tax, even as this marketing technique becomes more prevalent. Although some such merchants voluntarily agree to collect tax, Congress certainly could help states by devising some mechanism for enforcing this tax.
Attempting to levy a national tax as a supplement to state sales taxes would be folly. There is simply insufficient uniformity in what states tax and exclude to allow a linked federal tax to be fair and efficient. On the other hand, a separate national retail sales tax would complicate the work of state tax collection, increase the problems that businesses face in complying with multiple tax bases, and tax on a base not equal to household consumption. Other countries probably have it right when they select VATs to raise considerable revenue at the national level, because, in practice, such taxes using the credit-invoice method more fully exclude business purchases from tax, more completely tax household purchases than do retail sales taxes, and leave a better trail for enforcement. 
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